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fendant to present his evidence is thereby settled in the defendant's favor. And,
furthermore, since a second appeal can be perfected after the new trial which follows
the reversal of a directed verdict, the defendant should not be refused an opportunity
to present his evidence in the instant case merely on the ground that "piecemeal appeals" might result. If the circuit court had desired to prevent this result, it could have
allowed the defendant to offer his evidence there.

Procedure-Liability of Government Corporation for Costs-Authorization to "Sue
and Be Sued"-[Federal].-The Reconstruction Finance Corporation brought suit
in a federal district court to protect trade marks which had been assigned to it as
security for loans, and later purchased at a bankruptcy sale. The RFC was incorporated by act of Congress' and is empowered to "sue and be sued" in any court of
competent jurisdiction. 2 The trade marks litigation was decided against the RFC,3
but costs for the defendant were denied, the district court asserting that costs may be
imposed against a governmental agency only to the extent permitted by law, and that
no law permits costs to be assessed against the RFC.4 On appeal, held, since costs are
a normal incident of suit, Congressional authorization for the RFC to "sue and be
sued" indicates an intention to permit costs to be assessed against it. Reversed and
remanded. RFC v. J. G. Menihan Corp.5
This is the first case holding that the forty government-owned corporations which
Congress chartered with power to "sue and be sued" 6 are subject to assessment by a
court for costs where Congress has not so expressly provided. In two previous cases
other circuit courts of appeals have reached the opposite result.7
It has uniformly been held that as a part of the Federal Government's immunity
from suit without consent in a federal court, the government may be assessed for costs
only when it assents.8 This traditional immunity of the sovereign is based both on
the patent impracticability of enforcing judicial decrees against a predominating organization which may refuse to submit, and on the desirability of permitting the
government to function unencumbered by adverse private claims.9 Since any portion
of the immunity may be waived, when explicit Congressional authorization to assess
provides: "A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties ....for any of the reasons
for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United
States ..... "
' 47 Stat. 5 (1932), i5U.S.C.A. § 6oi (1939).
247 Stat. 6 (1932), iS U.S.C.A. § 604 (1939).
3 RFC v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 28 F. Supp. 920 (N.Y. 1939).
4 RFC v. J. G.Menihan Corp., 29 F. Supp. 853 (N.Y. 1939).
5 III F. (2d) 940 (C.C.A. 2d 1940), cert. granted 6i S. Ct. 26 (I940).
6Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381, 390 (1939).
7Nat'l Home v. Wood, 81 F. (2d) 963 (C.C.A. 7th 1936); FDIC v. Barton, io6 F. (2d) 737
(C.C.A. oth 1939).
9Shewan & Sons v. United States, 267 U.S. 86, 87 (1925). No distinction between the government and its agencies in the matter of costs appears to have been made in Rule 54(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
9United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 5oi (I94O).

RECENT CASES
costs against the government is lacking the courts may be called upon to determine
whether Congress nevertheless intended to waive the government's immunity."
When the "government itself,"" as distinguished from government-owned and
chartered corporations, is a litigant, the relinquishing of sovereign privileges is strictly
construed, 2 and permission to assess costs is not considered implicit in permission to
sue or be sued.3 Thus the United States has been permitted to recover costs in trial
courts in civil actions,14 even though it was not liable for costs when a private litigant
prevailed,'s and a statute allowing costs against the United States where it is an unsuccessful defendant has been held not to authorize imposition of costs against it where
it is an unsuccessful plaintiff. 6 Furthermore, when the government institutes suit, its
own claim may be reduced by a counterclaim to the entry of which it does not consent, 17 but no affirmative judgment, even for costs, can be entered against the government by reason of the successful counterclaim. 8
Where, however, the government acts in a capacity or in a manner which is considered remote from the integral functions of government, there is less reluctance on
the part of courts to imply permission of the government to be sued or to be assessed
for costs. Thus, when the government becomes a partner in,' 9 or the owner of,20 a
commercial enterprise, it is deemed to have waived its immunity, rather than to have
endowed the private organization with the attributes of sovereignty.
If these government corporations were to be viewed as integral parts of the government, it would be expected that courts would not assess costs against them on the
basis of their authorization to "sue and be sued" except insofar as they were deemed
to be commercial enterprises. However, in three recent cases the Supreme Court has
had occasion to consider the status of these corporations, and there is some indication
that in respect to them waivers of governmental immunity may be more liberally construed. In Keifer & Keifer v. RFC,2 X the Supreme Court decided that a subsidiary of
xoKeifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381, 389 (1939).

"xIn United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 5oI (1940), Mr. Justice Reed refers to "government as distinct from its functionaries."
2 Dupont v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924).
'3 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, i34 (1938) ("The sovereign by joining in suit accepts whatever liabilities the court may decide to be a reasonable incident of
that act ....although the sovereign does not pay costs."); United States v. Verdier, 164
U.S. 213, 217 (7896).
14Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279, 280, 296 (x902).
'5 United States v. Worley, 281 U.S. 339 (1930).
16The Glymont, 66 F. (2d) 617 (C.C.A. 2d 1933).
'7 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938). In admiralty, since the
subject of the action is there viewed as the collision, rather than as the claim of eitherparty, if
the government brings a libel, it is subject to judgment on the cross-libel. Luckenbach
Steamship Co. v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1925).
z8United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
'9 Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 904 (1824).
20Salas v. Panama R. Co., 234 Fed. 842 (C.C.A. 2d 1916).
2306 U.S. 38I (1939), noted in 37 Mich. L. Rev. ii66 (i939).
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the RFC was suable even though Congress had not expressly so provided.2 In FHA v.
Burr,23 the Court determined that the Federal Housing Administration was subject to
garnishment proceedings despite lack of explicit Congressional authorization.24 That
these decisions have not repudiated the strict construction doctrine in respect to
waiving sovereign immunity is demonstrated by the holding in United States v. Shaw,as
in which Mr. Justice Reed applies the traditional doctrine2 6 But by way of dictum he
states that "when authority is given" to "special government activities, set apart as
corporations or individual agencies ....

it is liberally construed."'7

Restricted to the particular situation, the result in the instant case appears sound in
that the RFC, in suing for trade-mark infringement, acts more like a private commercial enterprise2s than like a part of the government itself ;29 but this justification
may not be present in other cases where a government-owned corporation is an unsuccessful litigant.30 Use of the corporate form alone should not be the crucial test of
whether the waiver of sovereign immunities should be strictly construed, for integral
governmental tasks might best be performed through some such organizational
device.31 In the absence of explicit consent by Congress to have costs assessed against
the corporation in any appropriate case, perhaps the courts might adopt a flexible rule
and assess costs only when the litigation involves the corporation acting in a capacity
traditionally considered not essential to government.32
22Since the subsidiary, the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation, was viewed as being
a part of the RFC's agricultural assistance program, to allow the Regional Agricultural Credit
Corporation greater immunities than the RFC would in effect allow the RFC to do indirectly
what it could not do directly.
23

309 U.S. 242 (1940).

It was said that "authority once given is to be liberally construed" (ibid., at 245), but it
was also pointed out that the conclusion reached involved no increase of substantive liability
(ibid., at 248).
24

2s309 U.S. 495 (1940).
26 United States v. Shaw, 3og U.S. 495, 502 (1940). "It is not our right to extend the waiver

of sovereign immunity more broadly than has been directed by Congress.... !"
' Tbid., at 5oi. See Sloan Shipyards v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922).
28 See the collection of authorities in The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473 (D.C. N.Y. 1921), rev'd on
the facts 271 U.S. 562 (1921).
29 Kelfer & Keifer v. RFC, 3o6 U.S. L8i, 388 (1939). "Therefore the government does not
become the conduit of its immunity in suits against its agents merely because they do its
work .......
.3 Suits against agencies of the government have been treated as suits against the government itself where the government appeared to be the real party in interest, Schroeder v.
Davis, 32 F. (2d) 454 (C.C.A. 8th 1929), even though the agency had power to sue and be
sued in its own name, State Highway Com'n of Wyoming v. Utah Construction Co., 278
U.S. 194 (1929). The tax immunity of such agencies has been assumed. Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe, 3o6 U.S. 467, 477 (1939).
31McDiarmid, Government Corporations and Federal Funds, c. X (1938); Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations, 21 Va. L. Rev. 352, 466 (1935).
32 Costs, if assessed against a government agency, would be on the same basis as costs

assessed against private litigants. Where costs include attorneys' fees, as they may in equity,
and do in the principal case, the aggregate of such costs might be a substantial financial burden
upon the government.

